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Logical omniscience at the laboratory

By Ralph C. Bayer and Ludovic Renou

Abstract

Updated November 2008.\ud Updated May 2009.\ud Previously published as:\ud Homo Sapiens Sapiens Meets Homo Strategicus At The LaboratoryHomo Strategicus populates the vast plains of Game Theory. He knows all logical\ud implications of his knowledge (logical omniscience) and chooses optimal strategies given\ud his knowledge and beliefs (rationality). This paper investigates the extent to which\ud the logical capabilities of Homo Sapiens Sapiens resemble those possessed by Homo\ud Strategicus. Controlling for other-regarding preferences and beliefs about the rationality\ud of others, we show, in the laboratory, that the ability of Homo Sapiens Sapiens to\ud perform complex chains of iterative reasoning is much better than previously thought.\ud Subjects were able to perform about two to three iterations of reasoning on average

Topics: iterative reasoning, depth of reasoning, logical omniscience, rationality, experiments, other-regarding preferences
Publisher: Dept. of Economics, University of Leicester
Year: 2008
OAI identifier: oai:lra.le.ac.uk:2381/7490

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