Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

By Ludovic Renou and Karl H. Schlag


This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret\ud equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain\ud about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide\ud several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting\ud environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a\ud non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent\ud with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan\ud (2004))

Topics: minimax regret, rationality, conjectures, price dispersion, auction
Publisher: Dept. of Economics, University of Leicester
Year: 2008
OAI identifier:

Suggested articles


  1. A Definition of Subjective Probability, doi
  2. (1999). A Theory of Fairness, doi
  3. (1995). A Theory of Play for Games in Strategic Form When Rationality is not Common Knowledge,
  4. (2000). Ambiguous Games, doi
  5. (2007). Auctions with Regret Averse Bidders, doi
  6. (2007). Axioms for Minimax Regret Choice Correspondences, doi
  7. Bargaining Solutions with Non-standard Objectives, doi
  8. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory, doi
  9. (1992). Choice in Context: Trade off Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, doi
  10. (2007). Choice under Complete Uncertainty when Outcome Spaces are State-Dependent, doi
  11. (2007). Choice with Anticipated Regret, doi
  12. (1987). Comportamento Razionale ed equilibrio nei giochi e nelle situazioni sociali, unpublished dissertation,
  13. (1995). Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, doi
  14. (1996). Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty, doi
  15. Ex Post Implementation, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior. doi
  16. (1954). Games against Nature. In
  17. (2008). Homo Sapiens Sapiens Meets Homo Strategicus at the doi
  18. (1989). Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-unique priors, doi
  19. (1989). Minimax-regret Strategies for Bargaining over Several Variables, doi
  20. (1999). On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria doi
  21. Price Dispersion in the Lab and on the Internet: Theory and Evidence, doi
  22. Pricing without Priors, 2007a, forthcoming in
  23. (1984). Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection, Econometrica, doi
  24. (1984). Rationalizable Strategic Behavior, Econometrica, doi
  25. Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept, doi
  26. Regret Aversion and Opportunity Dependence, 2007a, to appear in doi
  27. (2004). Regret Minimizing Equilibria and Mechanisms for Games with Strictly Type Uncertainty,
  28. (2005). Robust Monopoly Pricing: The Case of Regret, doi
  29. (1991). Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 2nd Edition, doi
  30. (2007). Statistical Decisions under Ambiguity, doi
  31. (1995). The Common Prior Assumption doi
  32. (1951). The Theory of Statistical Decision, doi
  33. (2002). Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, doi

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.