Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Existence of a Condorcet winner when views have other-regarding preferences

By Sanjit Dhami and Ali al-Nowaihi


Updated June 2008In standard political economy models, voters are 'self-interested' i.e. care only\ud about 'own' utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often\ud have 'other-regarding preferences'(ORP), i.e., in deciding among alternative policies\ud voters care about their payo¤s relative to others. We extend a widely used general\ud equilibrium framework in political economy to allow for voters with ORP, as in Fehr-\ud Schmidt (1999). In line with the evidence, these preferences allow voters to exhibit\ud 'envy' and 'altruism', in addition to the standard concern for 'own utility'. We\ud give sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have\ud ORP. This could open the way for an incorporation of ORP in a variety of political\ud economy models. Furthermore, as a corollary, we give more general conditions for\ud the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely selfish preferences

Topics: Redistribution, other regarding preferences, single crossing property
Publisher: Dept. of Economics, University of Leicester
Year: 2007
OAI identifier:

Suggested articles

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.