Location of Repository

Wages, Supervision and Sharing.

By Sarah B. Brown, Fathi Fakhfakh and John G. Sessions

Abstract

We investigate the relationship between pay, supervision and employee sharing. Our results suggest an inverse relationship between supervision and pay across both sharing and non-sharing firms, although the\ud trade-off is somewhat assuaged within the former. This would appear to contradict instrumental efficiency wage considerations, but could be rationalised within a gift-exchange context. In terms of specific sharing schemes, it would seem that employee share ownership plans are relatively more successful in alleviating the need to monitor, with higher rates of profit sharing inducing more, rather than less, supervision

Topics: Monitoring, supervision, profit-sharing, employee share ownership, efficiency wages
Publisher: Dept. of Economics, University of Leicester.
Year: 2000
OAI identifier: oai:lra.le.ac.uk:2381/4410

Suggested articles

Preview

Citations

  1. (1989). Analysis of Panel Data. Econometric Society M onographs. Cambridge:
  2. (1994). Bosses of Different Stripes: A Cross-National Perspective
  3. (1987). cAdam s. doi
  4. (1987). Carrots and Sticks: Pay, Supervision and Turnover.’ doi
  5. (1994). Compensating W age Differentials versus Efficiency W ages: An Empirical doi
  6. (1995). Conseil Supérieur de la Participation.’ M insitere du Travail,
  7. (1985). Does a Flexible Industry W age Structure Increase Employment? doi
  8. (1995). Does Employee Ownership Improve Incentives for Effort?’ Boston College W orking Papers in Economics, Number 303,
  9. (1995). Employee Participation, Ownership and Productivity: A Theoretical Framework.’Industrial Relations,344, doi
  10. (1984). Equilibrium Unemployment as a W orker Discipline Device. doi
  11. (1992). Incomplete Panels and Selection Bias.’ doi
  12. (1995). Is there a Trade-off between Supervision and W ages? An Empirical doi
  13. (1982). Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange.’ doi
  14. (1997). Le Partage du Profit en France.’
  15. (1991). Ownership, Agency and W ages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry.’Quarterly doi
  16. (1990). Paying for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence. W ashington D.C: The Brookings Institution.
  17. (1988). Productivity Effects of W orker Participation
  18. (1990). Profit Sharing and Productivity.’ In doi
  19. (1979). Rights and Production Functions: An Application to LabourM anaged Firms and Codetermination.’
  20. (1987). Sum m ers.
  21. (1989). Supervision and High W ages as Competing Incentives: A Basis for Labour M arket Segmentation Theory.’
  22. (1993). Supervision and W ages across doi
  23. (1976). The Challenge of Segmented Labor M arket Theories to Orthodox Theory.’
  24. (1956). The Inter-Industry W age Structure: 1899-1950.’ American Economic Review,46,
  25. (1991). The PEPPER Report: Promotion of Employee Participation
  26. (1985). The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: W alrasian,
  27. (1995). The Relationship between Supervision and Pay: doi
  28. (1990). The Structure of Supervision and Pay in doi
  29. (1957). The Task of Contemporary W age Theory.’ In doi
  30. (1987). The Theory of Contracts.’
  31. (1962). W age Differentials: Theory and M easurement.’
  32. (1990). W ho Bosses W hom?
  33. (1986). W orkplace Democracy: The Political Effects of Participation,

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.