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Reasoning about Strategic Interaction

By Andrew M. Colman


A discussion of some problems in game theor

Topics: Nash equilibrium, payoff dominance, strategic dominance, stable set, core
Publisher: Psychology Press
Year: 2004
OAI identifier:

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