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Stackelberg reasoning in mixed-motive games: An experimental investigation.

By Andrew M. Colman and J.A. Stirk

Abstract

This is the author's final draft, not the version as published in Journal of Economic Psychology www.elsevier.com/locate/joep\ud \ud This article was awarded the Citation of Excellence by ANBAR Electronic Intelligence.The Stackelberg heuristic is a simulation heuristic in which a player optimizes against best-reply counterstrategies, and a game is Stackelberg-soluble if the resulting Stackelberg strategies are in equilibrium. To test the hypothesis that players use this heuristic in Stackelberg-soluble games, 100 subjects played all 12 ordinally nonequivalent 2  2 games, nine of which (including Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt) were Stackelberg-soluble and three (including Battle of the Sexes and Chicken) were non-Stackelberg-soluble. Subjects significantly preferred Stackelberg strategies in Stackelberg-soluble games, and a protocol analysis of stated reasons for choice showed that joint payoff maximization and strategic dominance were given as reasons significantly more frequently in Stackelberg-soluble than in non-Stackelberg-soluble games

Publisher: Elsevier
Year: 1998
OAI identifier: oai:lra.le.ac.uk:2381/475

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