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Reframing libel: taking (all) rights seriously and where it leads

By Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott

Abstract

In preparing this paper, we have returned to first principles and re-evaluated fundamental aspects of libel law, its purposes, its substance, and its processes. Our thinking has been informed by, first, philosophical understandings of democracy and the public sphere and in particular the role of freedom of speech and of the media therein, and secondly, the social psychology of reputation and privacy. By doing this, we are able to ground some of the proposals for reform made previously by Index on Censorship, English PEN, Lord Lester, and others. We do so, however, not through the prism of an over-weaned emphasis on freedom of expression, but rather by triangulating the rights and interests of claimants, defendants, and the wider public. Ultimately, we recommend a coherent set of significant substantive and procedural reforms that if enacted would enhance access to justice and reduce costs for all but the most serious and/or most damaging libels. This involves the recommendation of the introduction of a two-track libel regime

Topics: K Law (General)
Publisher: Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 2010
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:32843
Provided by: LSE Research Online

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