Article thumbnail

Essays on Collective Choice of Locations of Public Facilities

By Kazuo Yamaguchi

Abstract

This thesis comprises three essays on the collective choice of locations of public facilities. In the first essay, we investigate a model where, on a tree network, players collectively choose the location of a single public facility by noncooperative alternating-offer bargaining with the unanimity rule. We show the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and the characterization of stationary subgame perfect equilibria. We also show that the equilibrium location converges to the Rawls location (the Rawlsian social welfare maximizer) as the discount factor tends to 1; however, it does not relate to the Weber location (the Benthamite social welfare maximizer). In the second essay, we examine a model where, on a line network, individuals collectively choose the location of an undesirable public facility through bargaining with the unanimity rule. We show the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and the characterization of stationary subgame perfect equilibria when the discount factor is sufficiently large. Furthermore, we show that as the discount factor tends to 1, the equilibrium location can converge to a location that is least desirable according to both the Benthamite and Rawlsian criteria. In the third essay, we consider the outcome of majority voting in multiple undesirable facility location problems where the locations of two facilities are planned, any individual is concerned about the location of the nearest facility but not about the location of the other facility, and any individual prefers that the location of the nearest facility be as far as possible from his/her location. We show that a Condorcet winner is a subset of the set of pendant vertices and the vertices adjacent to pendant vertices on a tree network with an odd number of individuals. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for a set of locations to be a Condorcet winner on a line network with an odd number of individuals.報告番号: 甲27710 ; 学位授与年月日: 2012-03-22 ; 学位の種別: 課程博士 ; 学位の種類: 博士(経済学) ; 学位記番号: 博経第306号 ; 研究科・専攻: 経済学研究科経済理論専

Topics: 332
Publisher: 東京大学大学院経済学研究科経済理論専攻
Year: 2012
OAI identifier: oai:repository.dl.itc.u-tokyo.ac.jp:2261/51834
Provided by: UT Repository
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://hdl.handle.net/2261/518... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.