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Judging as a non-voluntary action

By Conor McHugh

Abstract

Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of action. On the face of it, this claim is at odds with the seeming fact that judging a certain proposition is not something you can do voluntarily. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of non-voluntary action. An action can be non-voluntary without being involuntary. The notion of non-voluntary action is developed by appeal to the claim that judging has truth as a constitutive goal. This claim, when combined with a conception of judging as a way of settling a question, explains both why judging is genuinely agential, and why it is nevertheless non-voluntary. <br/

Topics: B1
Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.soton.ac.uk:196329
Provided by: e-Prints Soton
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