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REPUTATION EFFECTS WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC MODELS

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Abstract

We solve lor the reputational equilibrium in a class of linear quadratic, gaussian dynamic games with noisy control. This equilibrium is particularly simple to describe and tractable. There is imperfect monitoring but a sequential equilibrium is found where the uninformed agents always smoothly learn the type of the informed agent. Reputation effects are temporary in the infinite horizon case for positive discount rates; as the discount factor tends to unity there is a permanent reputation

Topics: HC
Publisher: OXFORD UNIV PRESS UNITED KINGDOM
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:21296
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