In the constitutional law of the United States there is a natural tendencyto emphasize the judicial enforcibility of constitutional restrictions uponlegislative action. This field of our law tends thus to give primary weightto a technical analysis of judicial decisions, at the expense of a considerationof the wisdom and expediency of legislative and executive action.Moreover, it largely overlooks a relatively large field of constitutional regulationnot supplemented by judicial enforcibility. We often compare to ouradvantage the system of judicially enforcible constitutions with that ofmany other countries in which written constitutions are not judicially enforciblebut depend for their effectiveness upon the political forces operatingwithin or upon the government.\u27 Something of more definite value mayperhaps be gained from an examination of the provisions of the federaland state constitutions that are not judicially enforcible under our systemof constitutional law. To what extent do such provisions exist, and towhat extent do they accomplish their purpose as effectively as judiciallyenforcible provisions
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