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Equilibrium agenda formation

By Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew O. Jackson and Michel Le Breton

Abstract

We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several specific settings and show that studying equilibrium agendas can lead to sharp predictions, in contrast with well-known "chaos" theorems

Topics: HC, H
Publisher: Springer
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:8169
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