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The structure of I-Thoughts. Kant and Wittgenstein on the genesis of Cartesian self

By Luca Forgione

Abstract

The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphysical questions. The aim of this paper is to highlight that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the “I" doesn’t perform a referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. Particularly, as far as the Cartesian illusion concerning the thinking subject’s immaterial nature is concerned, Kant and Wittgenstein seem to share the same philosophical concerns and focus on the same type of reference involved in the “I", obviously via different philosophical paths and antipodal metaphysical assumptions

Topics: Philosophy
Year: 2019
OAI identifier: oai:philpapers.org/rec/FORTSO-18
Provided by: PhilPapers
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