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The No‐Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation

By Greg Frost‐Arnold

Abstract

I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no-miracles argument (NMA). First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans-statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions and fails to unify disparate established claims. Third, many proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods not employed by science itself. Therefore, such naturalistic philosophers of science should not accept the version of scientific realism that appears in the NMA

Topics: Philosophy
Year: 2010
DOI identifier: 10.1086/650207
OAI identifier: oai:philpapers.org/rec/FROTNA-2
Provided by: PhilPapers
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