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Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases

By Jennifer Nagel

Abstract

To what extent should we trust our natural instincts about knowledge? The question has special urgency for epistemologists who want to draw evidential support for their theories from certain intuitive epistemic assessments while discounting others as misleading. This paper focuses on the viability of endorsing the legitimacy of Gettier intuitions while resisting the intuitive pull of skepticism – a combination of moves that most mainstream epistemologists find appealing. Awkwardly enough, the “good” Gettier intuitions and the “bad” skeptical intuitions seem to be equally strong. This chapter argues that it is not a coincidence that these two types of intuition register with equal force: they are generated by a common mechanism. However, the input to this mechanism is interestingly different in the two types of case, and different in a way that can support the mainstream view that Gettier cases tell us something about knowledge where skeptical intuitions involve systematic error

Topics: Philosophy
Year: 2012
DOI identifier: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0008
OAI identifier: oai:philpapers.org/rec/NAGMIG
Provided by: PhilPapers

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