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Preferential Admissions: An Unreal Solution to a Real Problem

By Clyde W. Summers

Abstract

Preferential admissions standards do not significantly increase the total number of minority students able to obtain a legal education. Because the admissions standards of law schools form a continuum of acceptable LSAT scores and undergraduate grade averages, moving down a sliding scale, a student preferentially admitted to a highly selective school would be admissible under the normal standards of a less selective school. The only possible gain is among those minority students not normally admissible by the minimum standards of the least selective schools. There has been no showing that it is necessary or desirable to reduce the admissions standards at the lower end of the scale. Preferential admissions, the author contends, do not increase the opportunities for legal education of minority students, but instead create handicaps to professional training. It has also led to a wasteful use of financial aid so as to reduce the total number of needy minority students who can go to law school. The author suggests a massive cooperative effort of all law schools to pool resources to meet more effectively the need for more minority lawyers

Topics: Law
Publisher: Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository
Year: 1970
OAI identifier: oai:digitalcommons.law.yale.edu:fss_papers-4908
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