Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection?

By Marcel Kahan

Abstract

This paper provides an empirical examination of the determinants of firms\u27 decisions where to incorporate. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find substantial evidence that firms are more likely to incorporate in states with corporate law rules that offer firms flexibility to devise their governance arrangement and significant but less robust evidence that firms are more likely to incorporate in states with higher quality judicial systems. Unlike prior studies, we find no evidence that firms are more or less likely to incorporate in states with anti takeover statutes. The latter results are consistent with the hypothesis that anti takeover statutes have no significant effect on a company\u27s marginal ability to resist takeovers

Topics: Law and Economics, Law and Economics
Publisher: NELLCO Legal Scholarship Repository
Year: 2005
OAI identifier: oai:lsr.nellco.org:nyu_lewp-1023
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/view... (external link)
  • http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.