Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Collective Behavior with Endogenous Thresholds

By Jun Xue

Abstract

We endogenize the threshold points in Granovetter’s threshold model of collective behavior (Granovetter 1978). We do this in a simple model that combines strategic complementarity and private information in a dynamic setup with endogenous order of moves. Looking at Granovetter’s model in the strategic context allows us to highlight the sensitivity of collective outcomes to the timing of the games and the reversibility of the actions, and to emphasize an extra incentive for people to follow other people: to encourage more people to follow them

Topics: Classification-JEL: C7, D7., Endogenous timing, irreversibility, threshold
Publisher: Faculty of Economics
Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/131645
Provided by: Apollo

Suggested articles

Citations

  1. (1992). A simple model of herd behavior’,
  2. (2004). Arms Races and Negotiations’, doi
  3. (1993). Equilibrium Selection doi
  4. (1997). Herd Behavior, the "Penguin Effect", and the Suppression of Informational Diffusion: An Analysis of Informational Externalities and Payoff Interdependency’, doi
  5. (2004). Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games’, in: doi
  6. (1994). Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a doi
  7. (1970). Introductory Real Analysis, doi
  8. (2000). Rethinking Multiple Equlibria doi
  9. (1997). Strategic Delay and the Onset of Investment Cascades’, doi
  10. (2003). Threshold Models of Collective Behavior’,

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.