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The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective.

By Thomas Metzinger

Abstract

In this chapter I will briefly sketch the outline of a representationalist theory of subjective experience. A representationalist theory is one that chooses to analyze its target properties­ those aspects of the domain which eventually are to be explained ­ on a certain level of description: by describing conscious systems as representational systems and conscious states as representational states, one hopes to achieve progress with regard to the relevant properties

Topics: Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
Publisher: MIT Press
Year: 2000
OAI identifier: oai:sammelpunkt.philo.at:267

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