Location of Repository

Intentional action, intention in action and motor representations: Some reflections on the Revised Causal Theory and its possible link with the Cognitive Neuroscience of Action.

By Lucía Amoruso and Romina Alejandra Ibarra

Abstract

By introducing the concept of intention in action John Searle helped to solve some of the main difficulties faced by the Causal Theory of Action. Yet, his modified theory raises new issues. Given this, the main goal of this article is to review certain problems posed by Searle’s Causal Theory taking into account recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action. Particularly, by using the concept of motor representation

Topics: Intentional action, Intention in action, Motor representation, Motor image, Psychology, BF1-990, Philosophy. Psychology. Religion, B, DOAJ:Psychology, DOAJ:Social Sciences
Publisher: Universidad de Córdoba
Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:doaj.org/article:3709d18a43774dc2986740e8bdb9287a
Journal:
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • https://doaj.org/toc/1852-4206 (external link)
  • http://revistas.unc.edu.ar/ind... (external link)
  • https://doaj.org/article/3709d... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.