Location of Repository

Phenomenal Knowledge without Phenomenal Concepts? On Jesse Prinz’ Theory of Mental Pointers

By Sergio Daniel Barberis

Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to present and criticize the reply of Jesse Prinz (2007) to the “knowledge argument” proposed by Jackson (1982). Prinz’ proposal relies on two tenets: in the first place, it is supported by an original neurocognitive theory about consciousness; in the second place, it rests on a philosophical theory about phenomenal knowledge that seems to avoid the supposition of phenomenal concepts (versus Loar, Tye and Papineau, inter alia). I argue that Prinz’ proposal is inadequate both on empirical grounds – concerning his theory of consciousness – and on more conceptual grounds – concerning his conception of phenomenal knowledge. I conclude that the postulation of phenomenal concepts seems to be unavoidable in order to explain the nature of phenomenal knowledge

Topics: Phenomenal Knowledge, Consciousness, Attention, Phenomenal Concepts, Mental Pointers., Psychology, BF1-990, Philosophy. Psychology. Religion, B, DOAJ:Psychology, DOAJ:Social Sciences
Publisher: Universidad de Córdoba
Year: 2011
OAI identifier: oai:doaj.org/article:7c59353b3b534117bb2611d30e9f1f74
Journal:
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • https://doaj.org/toc/1852-4206 (external link)
  • http://revistas.unc.edu.ar/ind... (external link)
  • https://doaj.org/article/7c593... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.