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Quine on Identity

By Jean-Yves Béziau


In a first section, we discuss Quine’s claim according to which identity is a logical notion. We point out that Quine mixes up various types of identities: trivial (or diagonal) identity, Leibniz identity, etc.; and this leads him to commit several mistakes. In a second section, we review Quine’s criticisms to various philosophers (Wittgenstein, Whitehead, Leibniz, etc.), who ac-cording to him made confusion between names and objects in defining identity. We show that in fact only Korzybski can be accused of such confusion. In a third section, we analyze the relation between identity and entity. We notice that for Quine a river is the result of the identification of river stages, but that he admits it as an entity by opposition to squareness, which according to him is a result of an identification process of higher abtraction

Topics: Quine, identity, definissability of identity, entity, singular terms, Philosophy (General), B1-5802, Philosophy. Psychology. Religion, B, DOAJ:Philosophy, DOAJ:Philosophy and Religion
Publisher: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
Year: 2003
OAI identifier: oai:doaj.org/article:c337cde6333240c299446d7040e59526
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