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Auction fever : theory and experimental evidence

By Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Marion Ott and Susanne Abele

Abstract

It is not a secret that certain auction formats yield on average higher prices than others. The phenomenon that dynamic auctions are more likely to elicit higher bids than static one-shot auctions is often associated with the term ''auction fever.'' On a psychological level, we consider the so-called pseudo-endowment effect as largely responsible for peoples’ tendency to submit higher bids, potentially amplified by the source-dependence effect. The phenomenon of auction fever is replicated in an experimental investigation of different auction formats within a private values framework where bidders have private but incomplete knowledge of their valuation for a hypothetical good. We suggest this assumption to be more realistic than definite private values, as assumed in the traditional IPV model. An additional experimental investigation within the traditional IPV framework does not either reveal any indication for the appearance of auction fever. On the basis of our experimental observations we present a model of reference-dependent utility theory that comprehends the phenomenon by assuming that bidders' reference points are shifted by the pseudo-endowment and the source-dependence effect

Topics: 330 Wirtschaft
Year: 2008
OAI identifier: oai:ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de:2316

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