Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts
Abstract
A cake is a metaphor for a heterogeneous, divisible good. When two players divide such a good, there is always a perfect division—one that is efficient (Pareto-optimal), envy-free, and equitable—which can be effected with a finite number of cuts under certain mild conditions; this is not always the case when there are more than two players (Brams, Jones, and Klamler, 2011b). We not only establish the existence of such a division but also provide an algorithm for determining where and how many cuts must be made, relating it to an algorithm, “Adjusted Winner” (Brams and Taylor, 1996, 1999), that yields a perfect division of multiple homogenous goods- MPRA Paper
- NonPeerReviewed
- D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D30 - General
- D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
- C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis
- D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- C72 - Noncooperative Games