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Short-run vs. long-run cooperation among the G-20 countries

By Gabriela Mundaca


In a model of repeated games, we determine the conditions under which cooperation is an equilibrium outcome among the G-20 countries. We consider first, that members are uncertain about the lifespan of the G-20. Second, the nature of member countries and their interrelations can change because of shifts in government regimes. Monitoring and peer pressure to comply with the agreements made are necessary if the goals are to achieve cooperation and thereby attain desirable common goals. If member countries are prone to shifting government regimes and governments are not concerned about their countries' reputations, continuous cooperation becomes more difficult.

Topics: F02 - International Economic Order, E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination, C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Year: 2011
DOI identifier: 10.2139/ssrn.1923258
OAI identifier: oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:33204

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