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Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale

By Slim Ben Youssef and Zeineb Dinar

Abstract

We develop a three stage game model composed of a regulator and two firms. These firms compete on the same market where they offer the same homogeneous good, and can invest in R&D to lower their emission/output ratio. By means of a tax per-unit of pollution and a subsidy per-unit of R&D level, the regulator can induce the first best outcome.

Topics: H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation, D62 - Externalities, O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D, C72 - Noncooperative Games
Year: 2009
OAI identifier: oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22480

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