Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

The Allocation of Decision-Making Authority when Principal has Reputation Concerns

By Yasunari Tamada and Tsung-Sheng Tsai


This paper analyzes the allocation of decision-making authority when the principal has reputation concerns. The principal can either keep the authority, or delegate it to the agent, who has better information. An outside evaluator who forms the principal's reputation cannot observe who makes the decision. The key feature of this paper is that the principal can in°uence her reputation through her delegation policy. With reputation concerns, we show that the principal tends to keep too much the authority from the evaluator's point of view, even though sometimes her information is not good enough for her to make the decision on her own.

Topics: D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights, L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks, D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Year: 2009
DOI identifier: 10.2139/ssrn.846704
OAI identifier:

Suggested articles

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.