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Self-Enforcing Climate Change Treaties: A Generalized Differential Game Approach with Applications

By de Mendonça Pedro

Abstract

Based on recent proposals on non cooperative dynamic games for analysing climate negotiation outcomes, such as Dutta and Radner (2004, 2006a), we generalize a specific framework for modelling differential games of this type and describe the set of conditions for the existence of closed loop dynamics and its relation to adaptive evolutionary dynamics. We then show that the Dutta and Radner (2004, 2006a) discrete time dynamic setup is a specific case of that generalization and describe the dynamics both analytically and numerically for closed loop feedback and perfect state patterns. Our discussion is completed with the introduction of a cooperative differential framework for welfare analysis purposes, within our non cooperative proposal for climate negotiations.

Topics: Q56 - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth, C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis, C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games, C72 - Noncooperative Games
Year: 2009
OAI identifier: oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17889

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