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The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure

By María Gómez-Rúa and Juan Vidal-Puga


We study three values for transferable utility games with coalition structure, including the Owen coalitional value and two weighted versions with weights given by the size of the coalitions. We provide three axiomatic characterizations using the properties of Efficiency, Linearity, Independence of Null Coalitions, and Coordination, with two versions of Balanced Contributions inside a Coalition and Weighted Sharing in Unanimity Games, respectively.

Topics: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Year: 2008
DOI identifier: 10.1016/j.ejor.2010.05.014
OAI identifier:

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