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Manipulations and repeated games in future markets

By Graciela Chichilnisky


This chapter analyzes the possibility of manipulation in futures markets, concentrating on the effects that manipulation may have on their informational efficiency . We use the concept of manipulation as it arises in the study of noncooperative games with imperfect information . The problem can be summarized as follows : disclosure that is, (less anonymity) may prevent manipulation and therefore improve the informational efficiency of the market . On the other hand, disclosure (less anonymity) may restrict entry, and therefore produce an efficiency loss. There is, in this sense, a tradeoff between informational efficiency and free entry.

Topics: G13 - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing, C72 - Noncooperative Games
Year: 1984
DOI identifier: 10.2139/ssrn.1370681
OAI identifier: oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8083

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