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Renégociation stratégique de la dette, risque comptable et risque juridique

By Bertrand Chopard and Eric Langlais

Abstract

This paper studies the influence of bankruptcy law (depending on whether the law is pro-lenders or pro-borrowers) on the borrowers propensity to demand the renegotiation of their debt, when there exist an asymmetrical information between lenders and borrowers. In the tradition of Law & Economics, we proceed to a study of impact for the main parameters of the model that capture the design of bankruptcy law, showing their influence on the probability of strategic bankruptcy and on the social welfare.

Topics: K0 - General, G0 - General, G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages, G20 - General, K35 - Personal Bankruptcy Law, K2 - Regulation and Business Law, G29 - Other
Year: 2007
OAI identifier: oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4805

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