Article thumbnail

Intimidation or Impatience? Jump Bidding in On-line Ascending Automobile Auctions

By David Grether, David Porter and Matthew ShumDavid Grether, David Porter and Matthew Shum

Abstract

Preliminary--Comments welcome (August 2011) Abstract: We run a large field experiment with an online company specializing in selling used automobiles via ascending auctions. We manipulate experimentally the maximum amount which bidders can bid above the current standing price, thus affecting the ease with which bidders can engage in jump bidding. We test between the intimidation vs. costly bidding hypotheses of jump bidding by looking at the effect of these jump-bidding restrictions on average seller revenue. We find evidence consistent with costly bidding in one market (Texas), but intimidation in the other market (New York). This difference in findings between the two markets appears partly attributable to the more prominent presence of seller

Year: 2016
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.964.1814
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://digitalcommons.chapman.... (external link)
  • http://digitalcommons.chapman.... (external link)
  • http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/v... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.