Abstract

St. Louis provided further useful comments. I analyze a communication game in which an uninformed decision maker chooses an action based on the advice of an informed but possibly biased expert. The quality of each alternative is described by a set of arguments, and each argument favors one of two alternatives. Each argument is veri\u85able, but the number of arguments is not. The expert selects a subset of arguments to reveal to the decision maker. In all equilibria the biased expert exaggerates his reports in favor of his preference, yet he does not suppress all of the unfavorable information. If the expert reports many arguments, the decision maker can infer the experts potential bias and bases her choice solely on the number of arguments that favor the expert; otherwise the experts report is ignored. If the decision maker expects the expert to be honest, the biased expert inates his reports more

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oaioai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.607.2156Last time updated on 10/29/2017

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