oaioai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.587.7333

By

Abstract

2 The following research investigates unraveling in two-sided matching markets and it’s prevalence within the sociological job market. Many two-sided matching markets exist in a competitive arena where a dual hierarchy exists between groups such as employer and employee. It is within this arena that competition drives innovation (from market pressure or active participation) and on each side of the hierarchy the participants attempt to pair with their optimal counterparts. Therefore an academic institution would prefer to hire an assistant professor with high academic accolades and prestige just as a new PhD would typically prefer to join as prestigious a university as possible. This thesis tests the sociological job market to see if such competition has progressively shifted deadlines earlier for all universities over time and whether the more prestigious universities are more likely to push deadlines ahead. Using the American Sociological Associations Employment bulletins from 1981 to 2003, a progressive shift in deadlines was observed and competition has resulted in the top ranked universities virtually setting the application due dates while lower ranked universities trail

Similar works

Full text

thumbnail-image
oaioai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.587.7333Last time updated on 10/29/2017

This paper was published in CiteSeerX.

Having an issue?

Is data on this page outdated, violates copyrights or anything else? Report the problem now and we will take corresponding actions after reviewing your request.