The East Asian region has suffered from a certain lack of confidence since the regional financial crisis of 1997–98. The earlier hubris, even conceit, following the East Asian miracle disappeared with the East Asian debacle. This came several years after the Japanese big bang, another disaster due to ill-considered financial liberalization. East Asian developments since then, especially greater regional cooperation, offer interesting lessons about the potential and limitations of the responses. The East Asian miracle and differences within the region A dominant explanation for the East Asian miracle—sustained and rapid economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s—saw the phenomenon as essentially due to unfettered market forces (Little, Scitovsky, and Scott 1970). The obvious policy implication was to liberalize, open up, and globalize. There were other, far less prominent efforts to explain the East Asian miracle, including heterodox viewpoints invoking institutionalist, evolutionary, post-Keynesian perspectives and so on. During the 1980s, several influential Western authors recast the Northeast Asia
To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.