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Contingent valuation and incentives

By Patricia A. Champ, Nicholas E. Flores, Thomas C. Brown and James Chivers

Abstract

ABSTRACT. We empirically investigate the ef-fect of the payment mechanism on contingent val-ues by asking a willingness-to-pay question with one of three different payment mechanisms: indi-vidual contribution, contribution with provision point, and referendum. We nd statistical evi-dence of more af rmative responses in the refer-endum treatment relative to the individual contri-bution treatment, some weak statistical evidence of more af rmative responses in the referendum treatment relative to the provision point treat-ment, and no statistical evidence of more af r-mative responses in the provision point treatment relative to the individual contribution treatment. The relative credibility of the three payment mechanisms is also examined. (JEL H41, Q26) I

Year: 2002
DOI identifier: 10.2307/3146855
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.484.300
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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