Beyond transparency: computational reliabilism as an externalist epistemology of algorithms

This chapter is interested in the epistemology of algorithms. As I intend to approach the topic, this is an issue about epistemic justification. Current approaches to justification emphasize the transparency of algorithms, which entails elucidating their internal mechanisms –such as functions and variables– and demonstrating how (or that) these produce outputs. Thus, the mode of justification through transparency is contingent on what can be shown about the algorithm and, in this sense, is internal to the algorithm. In contrast, I advocate for an externalist epistemology of algorithms that I term computational reliabilism (CR). While I have previously introduced and examined CR in the field of computer simulations ([42, 53, 4]), this chapter extends this reliabilist epistemology to encompass a broader spectrum of algorithms utilized in various scientific disciplines, with a particular emphasis on machine learning applications. At its core, CR posits that an algorithm’s output is justified if it is produced by a reliable algorithm. A reliable algorithm is one that has been specified, coded, used, and maintained utilizing reliability indicators. These reliability indicators stem from formal methods, algorithmic metrics, expert competencies, cultures of research, and other scientific endeavors. The primary aim of this chapter is to delineate the foundations of CR, explicate its operational mechanisms, and outline its potential as an externalist epistemology of algorithms

24 Philosophical Issues in Medical Imaging

This chapter aims to shed light on the normative questions raised by medical imaging (MI), paving the way for interdisciplinary dialogue and further philosophical exploration. MI comprises noninvasive techniques aimed at visualizing internal human body structures to aid in explanation, diagnosis, and monitoring of health conditions. MI requires interpretation by specialized professionals, and is routinely employed across medical disciplines. It is entrenched in clinical guidelines and therapeutic interventions. Moreover, it is a dynamic research field, witnessing ongoing technological advancements. After surveying philosophical issues arising from MI, which are relatively unexplored, the chapter focuses on the epistemology of diagnostic imaging. Specifically, it delves into what constitutes an image as evidence and how radiological procedures generate knowledge. The discussion dissects three facets of the radiological process: image interpretation, radiological reporting, and semantic analysis. Each facet carries distinct epistemic implications, as errors can manifest in various ways, affecting the acquisition of patient-relevant knowledge

Grouping approaches to PFAS and industry funding: a case study on the findings of a recent panel of experts

Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are a large class of chemicals, whose carbonfluorine bonds allow a wide range of industrial applications but also make them highly persistent. Since there is evidence about only a few of them and their properties may vary, one of the pressing issues regarding PFAS is how to group them for different purposes. In this paper, I aim to show how a recent panel of experts about grouping PFAS was co-opted in a way that favor the fluorine industry. The panel consisted of eleven experts, including authors renowned for views in conflict with fluorine industry regulatory approaches, answering questions through an online application. Its main results along with the experts’ answers were published in 2022 in the journal Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology. Through a detailed analysis of all the material published and in dialogue with the literature about industry-funded research, I will present how choices in the design of the panel (e.g., which kind of consensus the exercise could capture, the ways questions were framed or even changed), in textual analysis (e.g., criteria for assembling opinions) and in the communication of the findings (e.g., what gets included or excluded) were made in an industry friendly way affecting two specific grouping approaches. I conclude with some lessons about this kind of influence of industry funding

Philosophy of Psychology and Psychiatry

This chapter examines the history of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of psychiatry as subfields of philosophy of science that emerged in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. The chapter also surveys related literatures that developed in psychology and psychiatry. Philosophy of psychology (or philosophy of cognitive science) has been a well-established subfield of philosophy of mind since the 1990s and 2000s. This field of philosophy of psychology is narrowly focused on issues in cognitive psychology and cognitive science. Compared to the thriving subfield of philosophy of cognitive science, there has been a lack of corresponding interest among philosophers of science in broader methodological questions about different paradigms and fields of study in psychology. These broader methodological questions about psychology have been addressed in the field of theoretical psychology, which is a subfield of psychology that materialized in the 1980s and 1990s. Philosophy of psychiatry emerged as a subfield of philosophy of science in the mid-2000s. Compared to philosophy of psychology, the philosophy of psychiatry literature in philosophy of science engaged with issues examined in an older and more interdisciplinary tradition of philosophy of psychiatry that developed after the 1960s. The participation of philosophers of science in the literature on theoretical psychology, by contrast, has been limited

When Will Scientific Disagreement Bear Fruit?: A Case Study About Angiosperm Origins

The timing of the origin of flowering plants (Angiosperm) is hotly debated. It has been suggested that the disagreement between the fossil record of angiosperm origin strongly conflicts with the origin estimates generated by molecular clocks. I argue that this conflict reveals lessons about whether or under what conditions scientific disagreement is likely to bear fruit. Specifically, I point to issues of evidence quality and social epistemic structures which deserve more attention in understanding the productivity of disagreement

On Dieks against the Received View

Dennis Dieks addressed some criticisms of the so-called Received View (RV) of non-individual quantum objects in a series of papers. His main con- cern is that the RV doesn’t fit the practice of physics since in some situations the physicist assumes that quantum objects can be treated individually, im- itating standard objects (individuals) in classical physics. In this paper, we revise his argumentation, showing that it involves some misunderstand- ings regarding the objectives of the RV. Dieks also proposes an Alternative View (AV) which he thinks is more in accordance with the way physicists proceed. We argue that the AV is not conflating the RV, but is complementary to it, namely, substitutes it when quantum objects are sufficiently apart and can be treated as obeying classical logic. Thus, from the point of view of the practice of physics, in most cases, we can opt for the Alternative View, but the RV is more adequate when we are looking for logical and foundational analyses

Normal Science: not uncritical or dogmatic

When Kuhn first published his Structure of Scientific Revolutions he was accused of promoting an “irrationalist” account of science. Although it has since been argued that this charge is unfair in one aspect or another, the early criticism still exerts an influence on our understanding of Kuhn. In particular, normal science is often characterized as dogmatic and uncritical, even by commentators sympathetic to Kuhn. I argue not only that there is no textual evidence for this view but also that normal science is much better understood as being based on epistemically justified commitment to a paradigm and as pragmatic in its handling of anomalies. I also argue that normal science is an example of what I call Kuhn’s program of revisionary rational reconstruction

Outline for an externalist psychiatry (1): or, how to realise the biopsychosocial model

The biopsychosocial model in psychiatry has come under fire for being too vague to be of any practical use in the clinic. For many, its central flaw consists in lack of scientific validity and philosophical coherence: the model never specified how biological, psychological and social factors causally integrate with one another. Recently, advances in the cognitive sciences have made great strides towards meeting this very ‘integration challenge’. The paper begins by illustrating how enactivist and predictive processing frameworks propose converging accounts of biopsychosocial integration that are far superior to those of previous theories. It argues, however, that the main problem of implementing the biopsychosocial model has less to do with integration than with the lack of a social aetiology. Psychiatric practice leans heavily towards ‘bio’ and ‘psycho’ approaches, without an equally developed set of explanatory and therapeutic resources for dealing with the ‘social’ dimension of illness. This leaves psychiatry essentially internalist in orientation. As illustrated most poignantly by conditions such as functional neurological disorders, internalism comes with the risks of stigma and the curtailment of therapeutic possibilities. The paper argues that the answer to the failings of the biopsychosocial model lies in combining the integration challenge with the development of an ‘externalist psychiatry’, which casts both causes and treatment of psychiatric illness onto the social environment. The following two papers explore the conditions that might make this idea a reality

Dimensions of the Methodological Individualism/Holism Debate

Analyzing the doctrine of methodological individualism and its opposition to methodological holism, I start by briefly reviewing three historical periods in which the discussion around it was very lively (i.e., the turn of the century around 1900, the 1950s, and the 1980s-90s) explicating the variety of characterizations of methodological individualism. To highlight the connection of these philosophical discussions to social scientific practice, intradisciplinary as well as interdisciplinary dynamics, I then look into the debates around microfoundations (in the 1980s) and so-called economics imperialism in the social sciences (and its impact within political science in the 1990s). While both the microfoundations project and economics imperialism are driven by methodological individualists, here too it seems important to pay attention to the variety of understandings of methodological individualism as well as the exact ambition of their undertakings (evaluated along different dimensions, i.e., ontological, epistemological, axiological, and institutional). Overall, I conclude that when looking into the history of the social sciences, the best philosophers can do when discussing methodological individualism and holism is to carefully distinguish the broad variety of positions that can be evaluated along multiple dimensions, to demonstrate the benefits of methodological pluralism as well as expose the downsides of methodological monocultures

Stating Maths-First Realism, or: How to Say Things with Models

The aim of philosophy of physics, broadly speaking, is to interpret physical theories. Since those theories are expressed mathematically, this means either extracting meaning from their mathematical models or endowing those models with meaning. The traditional means by which we interpret theories is language. But there seems to be a mismatch between the content of those models and that of their linguistic interpretations; hence the desire to avoid linguistic means in the process of interpretation altogether. Wallace’s ‘maths-first realism’ is a recent expression of this desire. It is still unclear, however, how mathematical models can mean anything in the absence of a linguistically-provided interpretation. In this talk I will survey a range of options and their complications. I will conclude that if language-free interpretation is possible at all, it would radically alter the face of philosophy of physics