Roy A. West v. Dwight C. Jones, Theresa T. Caldwell, Leontine T. Kelly, John L. Howlette, Reginald L. Brown, and Walter T. Kenney

Supreme Court of Virginiahttps://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/va-supreme-court-records-vol228/1050/thumbnail.jp

Planning Commission of the City of Falls Church, Virginia, et al. v. Irving Berman, Betty Berman and The Red Barn System, Inc.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia at Richmondhttps://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/va-supreme-court-records-vol211/1135/thumbnail.jp

The Risk of Regulatory Arbitrage: A Response to \u3cem\u3eSecurities Regulation in Virtual Space\u3c/em\u3e

In Securities Regulation in Virtual Space, Eric. C. Chaffee explores the potential applicability of the securities laws to virtual transactions based on virtual activity and argues that, although many of these transactions likely qualify as “investment contracts” under S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., they should be excluded under the context clause because, among other reasons, application of the securities laws would stifle creativity within this innovative space. This Response proposes a reframing of the Howey test as a response to the risk of regulatory arbitrage, argues that the context clause should only exclude transactions that do not pose such a risk, contends that transactions in virtual space do pose a risk of regulatory arbitrage, and thus concludes that these transactions should not be excluded from the securities laws. In recognition of Professor Chaffee’s compelling argument that securities regulation would hinder creativity within this burgeoning area, this Response argues for a new exemption from registration that would further the policy goals of the securities laws while not stifling innovation in virtual space

T. H. Nottingham and S. T. Nottingham v. Farmers & Merchants Trust Bank

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia at Richmondhttps://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/va-supreme-court-records-vol170/1032/thumbnail.jp

Pollard&Bagby, Inc. , Trustee, et al., v. City of Richmond, et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia at Richmondhttps://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/va-supreme-court-records-vol181/1019/thumbnail.jp

The Commercial & Savings Bank of Wincester v. Minnie E. Burton, et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia at Richmondhttps://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/va-supreme-court-records-vol183/1015/thumbnail.jp

Southern Railway Company v. Cohen Weenen & Company

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia at Richmondhttps://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/va-supreme-court-records-vol156/1016/thumbnail.jp

The Once and (Maybe) Future \u3cem\u3eKlein\u3c/em\u3e Principle

This Response considers Evan Zoldan’s argument, set forth in his recently-published Article, that one can find a coherent principle underlying the vexing case of United States v. Klein in the idea that government is prohibited from what Zoldan calls “self-dealing.” The promise is a seductive one: Klein, and in particular its language prohibiting Congress from dictating “rules of decision” to courts, has puzzled scholars for generations. As Zoldan explains, other understandings of Klein all encounter significant obstacles in the form of precedent that rebut other explanations of what that case really means. Unfortunately, Zoldan’s valiant and careful effort encounters serious difficulties of its own. His self-dealing prohibition arguably conflicts with an early post-Klein case, Eslin v. District of Columbia, and conflicts even more seriously with the Court’s most recent case to consider Klein, Patchak v. Zinke, which was decided after Zoldan published his article. There is also reason to question the practical workability and conceptual coherence of the self-dealing prohibition Zoldan offers. But Patchak also offers hope for those, like Zoldan, who see worth in the possible normative values implicit in Klein. Patchak featured a not-insignificant line-up of justices who expressed sympathy with a meaningful reading of Klein as a limit on Congress’s power to legislate in hyper-specific ways and ways that leave no role for judicial analysis. Ironically, then, while Patchak calls into serious question Zoldan’s solution to the Klein puzzle, it also offers hope that the Court might eventually embrace a more meaningful Klein principle