The paper presents an account of the concept of existence that is based on Brentano’s work. In contrast to Frege and Russell, Brentano took ‘exists’ to express a concept that subsumes objects and explained it with recourse to the non-propositional attitude of acknowledgment (belief-in). I argue that the core of Brentano’s view can be developed to a defensible alternative to the Frege-Russell view of existence
This paper argues from the rationality of nostalgia, affirmation, and regret to a principle of ‘specificity’: it can be rational to respond more strongly to facts that provide us with reasons than to the fact that such reasons exist
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