Srbija za vreme i nakon Miloševića

The article looks into the nature of the Serbian political regime under Milosevic and under Đinđić. After the discussion on the suitability of various types of definition of non-democratic regime, the article classifies both regimes as hybrid democracies by way of applying the definition of competitive authoritarianism developed by Levistky and Way. The last part discusses four areas of competitive authoritarianism.U tekstu se analizira priroda političkog režima za vreme vladavine Slobodana Miloševića i vlade Zorana Đinđića. Nakon diskusije o primenljivosti različitih definicija nedemokratskih režima na slučaj Srbije za vreme i nakon vladavine Miloševića, tekst klasifikuje oba režima kao kvazidemokratska, primenjujući koncept kompetitivnog autoritarizma koji su razvili američki teoretičari Levitski (Levistky) i Uej (Way). Poslednji deo teksta analizira četiri oblasti karakteristične za kompetitivni autoritarizam u oba slučaja

Slobodni mandat - ustavnopravni fosil?

The author of this article analyzes character of free mandate in Serbian parliamentary system, in light of the Constitutional Court's decision to suspend provisions on the causes for suspension of the mandate. These provisions were suspended primarily on the basis of suspension of the deputy's membership in political party and the ban on the political party's activity. The author gives theoretical premises about the genesis of imperative and free mandates and analyzes the dilemma whether the free mandate was constitutional and legal fossil because of influence of political parties. The author points out problems of implementation of the free mandate on the basis of examples of problems of treatment of the deputy mandates in the National Assembly of Republic of Serbia. The author also pointed out problems which would eventually arise during application of the Constitutional Court's decision. The author's stance is that a new Constitution of Serbia has to clearly define free character of the deputy mandate, but also to neutralize, through other measures, the trading of the deputy mandates and the possibility of betrayal of citizens' will by non-election methods.Autor u članku analizira karakter slobodnog mandata u parlamentarnom sistemu Srbije i u svetlu odluke Ustavnog suda da suspenduje pojedine odredbe o razlozima za prestanak mandata prvenstveno zbog prestanka članstva u političkoj stranci sa čije je liste poslanik izabran i zabrane rada političke stranke. Autor izlaže teorijske stavove o genezi imperativnog i slobodnog mandata i analizira dilemu da li je - zbog uticaja političkih stranaka slobodni mandat ustavno-pravni fosil. Na primerima problema u tretiranju poslaničkog mandata u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Srbije autor ukazuje na probleme ostvarivanja slobodnog mandata i probleme koji će nastati u primeni odluke Ustavnog suda. Stav je autora da novi Ustav Srbije mora jasno definisati da je poslanički mandat slobodan, ali da se drugim merama moraju bar otežati postupci trgovine poslaničkim mandatima i mogućnost da se na takav način izneveri i neizbornim metodama izmeni volja građana

Yugoslavia’s successor states

The paper discusses territorial disputes that arose during and after the break up of Yugoslavia. It starts by outlining the institutional context of the multinational Yugoslav federation within which the application of the uti possidetis principle, that is, the transformation of interrepublican borders into international frontiers, and denial of collective rights and territorial autonomy to minority groups in new states triggered large-scale nationalist violence. The paper then discusses in detail territorial disputes and conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro (incl. Kosovo) and Macedoni

Prestanak važenja islamsko-osmanskog prava i nastanak srpskih zakona u XIX veku

Pendant son histoire l'état Ottoman n'avait jamais Dans ses actes officieles le nom Turquie, qu'on emploie aujourd'hui pour désigner Cet état. Encore d'autant Cet état plus les sultans ottomans évitaient d'employer le nom Turquie soit pour l'état, soit pour designer leur appartenence nationale. Le droit qui régissait les rapports entre les habitants était le droit musulman da la rite hanephit, créé plusiers sciecles avant la création de Cet état. C'est pourquoi on ne peut pas apeller cette droit le droit turque comment on fait souvent. Les conséquences de cette politique sont très importantes, parce que les jeunes générations ne reçoivent des informations exacts sur l'histoireVladajuće pravo u Osmanskoj carevini bilo je islamsko zato što je ta država pretendovala da ostvaruje islamsku misiju i njen se legitimitet zasnivao na tome. Nacionalna pripadnost bila je nevažna činjenica u legitimizaciji političke vlasti. Zato je upotreba termina: Turska, tursko carstvo, turski pravni poredak, bez objašnjenja da pojam Turčin, Turska, itd. u to vreme nema nacionalnu sadržinu već je sinonim za versku pripadnost, izvor velikih nesporazuma u razumevanju suštine te države. A posledice toga su za današnje odnose u svim krajevima gde se vlast te države protezala nesagledive

Organizacija vlasti u predlozima za novi ustav Srbije

All proposed projects within the discussion round on new Constitution of Serbia emphasize the principle of authority division. The division on legislative and executive authority has been thoroughly implemented, even into the proposal of P. Nikolić, whose concept of authority division is related to the model of parliament monarchy. Differences between proposed projects on the authority organization in the new Constitution are results of the level and model of decentralization, not of the authority of the government body. Nor they are, as the polemics may lead to wrong conclusion results of the role and authority of the president of Republic. In all the projects the function of the head of the state is standard for the system of double centered executive authority dominated by the government, while the role of the head of the state is of protocol character only. Direct selection of president of the state, as proposed by the project of Serbian Democratic Party, is not sufficient to secure the moderator role, as envisioned by the propose.U raspravama o novom ustavu Srbije svi predloženi projekti insistiraju na načelu podele vlasti. Podela na zakonodavnu i izvršnu vlast dosledno je izvedena po parlamentarnom modelu organizacije vlasti čak i u predlogu P. Nikolića čiji koncept počiva na parlamentarnoj monarhiji. Razlike među predloženim projektima novog ustava posmatrane kroz organizaciju vlasti proizilaze prvenstveno iz stepeni i oblika decentralizacije, a ne iz nadležnosti organa ili, kako bi se iz polemika moglo pogrešno zaključiti, iz položaja i uloge predsednika Republike. Šef države u svim projektima ima funkcije standardne za sistem bicefalne egzekutive u kojem dominira vlada, a šef države ima protokolarnu ulogu. Neposredan izbor predsednika države koji se predlaže u projektu Demokratske stranke Srbije nije dovoljan da obezbedi moderatornu ulogu za koju se predlagač zalaže

Dijagnostičke mogućnosti indeksa za procenu kognitivnog funkcionisanja na Rorschach testu

The study presents theoretical and empirical comparison of the three indexes in Rorschach Comprehensive System that were developed for psychotic functioning assessment: the Schizophrenia Index (SCZI), the Ego Impairment Index (EII) and the Perceptual Thinking Index (PTI). In spite of the conceptual and nominal differences, these indexes significantly overlap and includes common indicators. The study compared a discrimination value of these three indexes, as well as and theirs indicators and based on the obtained results, tried to formulate a new index as a composite of the best predictors.Istraživanje predstavlja teorijsku i empirijsku komparaciju tri indeksa za procenu psihotičnog funkcionisanja sa Rorschach testa. To su Indeks shizofrenije (SCZI), Indeks Ego oštećenja (EII) i novi Indeks percepcije i mišljenja (PTI). Uprkos razlikama u nazivu, kao i razlikama u konceptualnim polazištima, ovi indeksi se značajno preklapaju jer uključuju slične indikatore. Istraživanje je imalo za cilj da ispita diskriminativnu vrednost ovih indeksa i njihovih pojedinačnih indikatora, kao i da na osnovu dobijenih rezultata formira novi indeks koji uključuje indikatore sa najboljom diskriminativnom vrednošću

Grassroots groups, Milošević or dissident intellectuals? A controversy over the origins and dynamics of the mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s

The mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs, barely noticeable from the capital initially but highly visible at the centre political stage between 1986 and 1988, played an important part in the political struggles of the late socialist Yugoslavia. The prevailing view in the literature is that Kosovo Serbs were little more then passive recipients of the attitudes and actions of high officials and dissident intellectuals. The elite thesis says that Belgrade-based dissident intellectuals initiated and guided the mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs, aiming to undermine the party's approach to Yugoslavia's national question and to initiate reassessment of the official policy on Kosovo and Serb-Albanian relations. According to the thesis, Milošević then took over and orchestrated the action of various groups of Kosovo Serbs in order to make the case for the removal of Kosovo's autonomy. The intellectuals and Milošević have generally supported this interpretation, claiming their role in the events leading to the constitutional change to the disadvantage of Kosovo Albanians in 1989-1990. Drawing on previously unavailable sources, I have found that various grassroots groups of Kosovo Serbs played a decisive role in the mobilisation, originating from the post-1966 twist in the politics inequality and thier rapid demographic decline in Kosovo. I show that the mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs was autonomous through a close look into thier protest networks, demands and protest strategies as well as their links with the dissident intellectuals, other confidants and high officials of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo. The high officials tolerated the mobilisation partly because of the political changes that occurred in the first half of the 1980s, partly because of the small scale of mobilisation and partly due to the moderate strategies of the protest groups. Having in mind the episodes of mobilisation in socialist Yugoslavia, such as the 1968 and 1981 protest of Kosovo Albanians, it is hardly surprising that changes in political context favourable to a group, rather than a deterioration of its relative position, often lead to the protest of its members. The argument in this article only partly touches upon the role of institutional factors in the rise of the movement of Kosovo Serbs, since I have discussed this relationship elsewhere

Institutional power and the rise of Milošević

The argument about the centrality of political programme in Milošević's ascent deserves a careful scrutiny not only because it has long served as a dominant interpretation of these historical events, but also since it reflects broader debates on political developments in the region and the nature of power structure in socialist party-states in general and Yugoslavia in particular. The political programme thesis draws on, and provides support for, the prevailing views on the conflicts surrounding the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which focus on nationalist strategies of political actors and institutional arrangements and informal elite practices that regulated inter-ethnic and inter-regional relations. The thesis also reflects a dominant view on the nature of power structure in socialist Yugoslavia in the 1980s. According to this view, sudden personality shifts at the top were unlikely to occur without a profound conflict over policy because Yugoslavia featured collective leadership at all levels as a result of the institutional legacy and elite settlement, which had been cemented early in the previous decade. Consequently, without a new programme persuasive to high party officials or population at large, Milošević would not have been able to change power relations in the higher party echelons and purge powerful rivals from leadership