We\u27re Not Selling Ice Cream Here : PLCAA, the Predicate Exception, and Providing Relief for Plaintiffs

In 2005, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”) put a stop to most civil litigation against the firearms industry. In the nineteen years since, victims of gun violence have attempted to bring claims against members of the firearms industry, with varying degrees of success, using an exception to PLCAA known as the predicate exception. Recently, states have begun to pass legislation creating a right of action for plaintiffs to take advantage of the predicate exception. Whether the new legislation will be successful, however, remains to be seen. This Note examines all of the available cases considering the predicate exception, revealing areas where the current regulatory framework fails plaintiffs and the distinguishing characteristics of successful cases. In light of this analysis, Part III discusses recent state legislation, identifies gaps in the legislation, identifies areas for improvement, and forecasts challenges to the legislation. The Appendix contains a chart organizing the cases that consider the predicate exception by whether they were successful and the predicate statute considered by the court in each case

Historical Analogy and the Role Morality of Reason-Giving

The Supreme Court has turned ever more to analogical reasoning from history and tradition to decide significant matters of public policy. Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than in the Court’s 2022 decision in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen. The Court’s crafting of a Second Amendment test that turns almost entirely on the strength of analogies—and on a topic of such intense public salience—has thrust analogical reasoning to the forefront of judicial and academic debate. While many have questioned the workability of Bruen’s focus on historical analogs, this Essay is less concerned about the pragmatics of Bruen and more focused on the ethical implications of this type of reasoning. In sum, if the Supreme Court is going to decide constitutional cases through historical analogies, it should do so in a way that is functional as law and is intelligible to the three hundred million people for whom it rules. After outlining the role morality of reason-giving by judicial officers in our system of judicial review, this Essay provides an overview of the psychology of reasoning by analogy by both lawyers and lay persons and the role of generality, systematicity, and rules of relevance in constructing such analogies. It then identifies three hazards confronting courts attempting to apply Bruen’s analogical method: reliance on surface rather than structural similarities; analogs that lack any stable or discernable rule of relevance; and finally, use of analogs so unmoored from public intuition and experience that they appear unreasonable or contrived. Using Second Amendment litigation as an example, the Essay concludes by showing how the Court can articulate a system of analogical reasoning from history and tradition that avoids these pitfalls and is consonant with the role morality of judicial officers who must offer intelligible legal reasons for their decisions

A Fireside Chat with Hon. Kate Heinzelman

Speaker: Hon. Kate Heinzelman, General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agenc

Getting to Home: Understanding the Collateral Consequences of Negative Records in the Rental Housing Market

The United States faces a rental housing crisis marked by a scarcity of housing supply, leading to intense competition among prospective tenants. This crisis is a particular challenge for the more than one hundred million U.S. residents burdened with negative records such as criminal records, debts in collections, and evictions. Landlords have more access than ever to applicants’ information, yet little is known about how landlords process and think about these records to make housing decisions. This Article draws on theories of cultural sociology to provide a data-driven understanding of how landlords conceptualize the value of several types of personal records and what it means to use them legally and fairly. It offers a window into how decision-makers evaluate and ascribe meaning to records—including negative records, for which tenants can be denied housing—and how these meanings subsequently guide landlords’ rental decisions. Through eighty-eight interviews with landlords, property managers, rental company executives, and tenant-screening company executives, this interdisciplinary, multistate study leverages comparisons across record type and organization size. It shows how access to housing largely depends on cultural understandings of the morality of different types of negative records. Depending on the type of risk landlords perceive, they call upon different cultural archetypes when deciding how and why to include certain records in their decision-making. However, the processes by which landlords incorporate these cultural considerations vary by organizational size and stem from their perceptions of the law. This Article thus provides a key theoretical insight: Landlords operate with broadly shared cultural understandings about the nature of risk and the morality of various types of negative records, but with different conceptions of what it means to make rental decisions legally and fairly. Differences correspond with the structure and size of decision-makers’ organizations. This means that collateral consequences play out differently depending on the type of landlord a prospective tenant is dealing with. As part of this discussion, this Article further provides a novel understanding of how state and local data-use laws, as well as the Fair Housing Act, operate on the ground. Ultimately, the theoretical insights from this study can help inform housing policy going forward

Corporate Racial Responsibility

The 2020 mass protests in response to the deaths of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor had a significant impact on American corporations. Several large public companies pledged an estimated $50 billion to advancing racial equity and committed to various initiatives to internally improve diversity, equity, and inclusion. While many applauded corporations’ willingness to engage with racial issues, some considered it further evidence of corporate capitulation to extreme progressivism at shareholders’ expense. Others, while thinking corporate engagement was long overdue, critiqued corporate commitment as insincere. Drawing on historical evidence surrounding the passage of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this Article engages with the debate on corporate “racial” responsibility to demonstrate that corporate engagement on race is not new. Indeed, during the struggle to desegregate public accommodations, corporate social responsibility was invoked to encourage voluntary desegregation and avoid federal intervention. Segregation was good business for some; for others, maintaining white supremacy justified any pecuniary losses. While this Article argues that corporations have a role to play in achieving racial equity, it cautions against reliance on corporate social responsibility to advance racial equality. Past and current iterations of corporate racial responsibility have often represented a market-fundamentalist, value-extractive approach to racial equity that reifies existing racial hierarchies. By valuing racial equity in terms of its potential profitability, corporate racial responsibility can subordinate human dignity to wealth maximization. This Article argues for a more meaningful corporate racial responsibility that addresses the structures and laws undergirding racial inequities within corporations and our larger society